Can young children report coherently on their emotions, and how do their reports contribute to our understanding of emotional development? Two-hundred six children ages 3 to 6 years participated in structured laboratory tasks designed to elicit a range of positive and negative emotions and indicated their emotional state following each task. Children's reports of their emotions meaningfully varied along with the nature of the different tasks during which they were collected (i.e., reports of negative and positive emotions differed across tasks designed to elicit those states). There were no sex differences on reports of any emotion and only small age differences. Multilevel modeling analyses demonstrated that children's self-reports of each emotion converged significantly with objective coding of expressions of those emotions across laboratory tasks; higher convergence for some emotions was associated with older age, higher verbal intelligence, and greater emotion-recognition abilities.
The emerging discipline of affective science aims to broadly map the domain of emotion (Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2002) , building on decades of work exploring the structure (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1997) and biological bases (e.g., Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000) of subjective emotional experience in adults. Although there is a richly developed literature concerning the role of social and contextual factors in broad measures of children's emergent social adjustment (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Saarni, 1999) , research on the phenomenology and structure of emotions has been less actively pursued in child samples than in adult samples. This may be partially attributable to concerns as to whether young children have the requisite cognitive abilities to provide subjective reports of their emotions. However, developmental science is increasingly demonstrating that under appropriate conditions, even very young children display considerable abilities to convey information regarding their inner state (Fivush & Baker-Ward, 2005) .
This study examined the validity of children's subjective reports of emotion in response to laboratory tasks designed to elicit a wide range of affective states. The aim was to explore the boundaries of young children's ability to report coherently on their emotions and the degree of convergence between those reports and objective measures of emotion. A greater understanding of children's subjective emotional experience is critical to the larger literature on the structure of emotion for several reasons. First, it is important to map the development of subjective experience of emotion, because the ability to perceive and categorize a feeling state is a central component of emotion (Barrett, 2005; Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007) . Second, self-report is the most common means of assessing emotion in adult samples, and this measurement strategy has produced a number of important findings regarding the nature of emotion. Thus, a greater understanding of subjective emotion in children will provide an important bridge in the life-span literature on emotion that attempts to map the developmental trajectory of emotions and related constructs from childhood to adulthood.
Theoretical Approaches to the Development of Emotion
Three primary theoretical frameworks have informed developmental studies of emotion. Differential emotions theory (DET; Izard, 1991) , also known as basic emotion theory (Tomkins, 1984) , has motivated seminal work on the expressive components of emotion. DET asserts that certain "basic" emotions are present in infancy in much the same form as in adults and that the timing of their emergence is limited only by maturation (Izard, 1991) . These putatively basic emotions are defined by unique facial expressions, distinctive feeling states, and innate neural substrates (Izard, 1992) . Nearly all developmental work derived from DET has focused on the first of these components-facial expressionstaking these as direct indicators of an underlying affective state (Izard, 1992) . Thus, because children exhibit facial expressions of happiness, interest, sadness, anger, fear, and surprise that are morphologically similar to those in adults, they are proposed to have similar subjective experiences of these states, although they may lack the cognitive or linguistic skills to label them as adults do. Thus, one would predict that given sufficiently developed cognitive skills and the appropriate circumstances, even young children should be able to describe their experience of these "basic" emotional states.
Functionalist models (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994; Frijda, 1986) emphasize the motivational components that underlie emotion. This approach highlights the salience of emotion-eliciting contexts for children's goals; emotions that occur in a particular context are determined by the personal goals activated therein, rather than being directly elicited by the context. Thus, from this perspective, very few (if any) stimuli are considered universally effective for eliciting a particular emotion; children may have different emotional reactions to the same context depending upon its personal significance (owing to its relation to goals, the presence of social signals from others, or the hedonic quality of the context; Campos et al., 1994) . Importantly, these models deemphasize the centrality of any one behavior (such as facial expressions) to emotion, suggesting instead that emotions may be indicated by a broad range of behaviors. From a functionalist perspective, one would expect subjective reports of emotion to be as illuminating with respect to the core experience of emotion as are behavioral indicators.
Finally, temperament theorists have also explored the development of emotions, focusing on individual differences in dispositional reactivity and regulation of positive and negative emotions. As with DET, modern temperament models (e.g., Goldsmith & Campos, 1990; Rothbart & Bates, 1998) propose a set of core underlying biological systems that govern emotional processes. This research has revealed a structure characterized by two orthogonal higher-order traits relevant to emotion, positive emotionality (PE) and negative emotionality (NE). The temperament literature suggests that the structure of individual differences in emotional experience is less differentiated than implied by basic emotion theory. Specifically, proneness toward fear, sadness, anger, and other negative states are intercorrelated and distinguishable from tendencies toward experiencing positive emotions. Importantly, the existing evidence suggests there is considerable continuity across childhood and adulthood with regard to the centrality of PE and NE as temperament superfactors (Shiner, 1998) . Measurement of PE and NE in adults relies principally on participants' descriptions of their dispositional subjective emotional state. Thus, exploring the continuity of temperamental emotionality traits across developmental time will require understanding of the emergence and structure of subjective emotional states in children.
Guided by one or more of these theoretical frameworks, emotion research has yielded a substantial body of literature on the phenomenology and development of emotion and related constructs in infants and toddlers (e.g., Buss & Kiel, 2004; Izard et al., 1995) . Studies of emotions in the preschool and early childhood period have expanded the nomological network of emotional expressions by exploring their associations with other markers or predictors of psychosocial adjustment, such as moral development (e.g., Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002) , social competence (e.g., Denham et al., 2003) , and parent socialization of emotion (e.g., Chaplin, Cole, & Zahn-Waxler, 2005) . By contrast, less is known about subjective elements of emotion in the preschool and early childhood years, despite this being a period of growing competence in children's ability to identify and discuss emotions (Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000; Widen & Russell, 2003) . Reliance on facial expressions as the primary indicator of emotional experience to the exclusion of other components narrows the insights that can be gleaned regarding emotional experience. Given the controversy regarding the centrality of facial expressions to the experience of emotion (Izard, 1992; Ortony & Turner, 1990) , it is important to examine the validity of alternative measures. In addition, as the growth of regulation capacities in the preschool and early childhood years results in reduction of the intensity of outward expressions of emotion, facial expressions may be less transparent indices of emotion as children age. Thus, subjective reports of emotion may provide critical information about emotional development in the posttoddler years.
Emotion Understanding and Self-Report of Emotion
For self-reports to provide a valid window into children's emotions, youngsters must be able to provide reports that coherently correspond with their internal state. This requires multiple processes, including monitoring one's underlying psychological states, recognizing the internal and external cues that mark emotions, and the use of language related to emotion. Of these, the ability to recognize facial expressions of emotion in others has been studied most extensively, although it should be noted that the processes involved in recognizing others' emotions may not overlap entirely with those involved in labeling one's own. The ability to differentiate among expressions of different emotions is apparent even in infancy and is refined considerably across toddlerhood and early childhood (McClure, 2000) . Existing data on emotion language in spontaneous speech suggest that production of emotion words (but not comprehension) is rare prior to the preschool years (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 1986) . During the preschool period, children also demonstrate growing abilities to understand the causes of emotions (e.g., Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994) . Taken together, this literature suggests that the preschool to early childhood period is one in which children may first possess the requisite skills to provide accurate reports of their own emotions, although no studies have directly examined whether these reports are meaningfully related to better-validated measures of emotion in children in this age range.
One important consideration in testing the validity of children's self-reports of emotion is to select an appropriate "gold standard" for comparison. Given the well-developed literature on expressive components of emotion, behavioral expressions of emotion are an obvious candidate. Temperament researchers have developed valid laboratory methods for systematic study of behavioral indicators of emotion in young children (e.g., Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001; Kochanska et al., 2002) . However, there are no studies examining children's subjective emotional response to these structured emotion probes.
In this study, I explored the validity of children's self-reports of their emotions collected after each of several emotion-eliciting laboratory tasks in a community sample of children ages 3 to 6 years. I examined the degree to which children's reports (a) were consistent with the pattern of emotion (or emotions) each task was designed to elicit and (b) converged with objective coding of their emotional expressions during the tasks. Three-to 6-year-olds were selected for several reasons. First, emotion recognition and understanding skills are substantially developed by this age. Preschoolers can accurately label facial expressions of happiness, sadness, and anger without training (Widen & Russell, 2003) and can also describe causes and consequences of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and surprise (Russell, 1990; Levine, Stein, & Liwag, 1999) . Second, individual differences in temperamental emotionality stabilize by the age of 3 (Caspi, 2000) , suggesting that the processes that influence children's sensitivity to emotion-eliciting tasks are developed by this age. Finally, existing studies of self-reported emotion in children have typically been conducted with children older than 6 years (Ialongo, Edlesohn, Werthamer-Larsson, Crockett, & Kellam, 1993; Laurent et al., 1999; Walden, Harris, & Catron, 2003) ; by contrast, little is known about younger children's self-reports of their emotions.
Hypotheses
This study explored three questions. First, can young children report meaningfully on their emotional state? I addressed this question by examining children's reports of emotion to structured tasks designed to elicit distinct states (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear). If children can validly describe their emotions, two results should obtain: (a) Their self-reports should differ across tasks designed to elicit distinct emotions, and within any one task, emotions that differ in their likelihood of being observed should be reported at different rates. (b) Children's self-reported emotions across various tasks should vary significantly with objective coding of their expressions of these emotions across the same tasks.
Second, I tested whether there were age or sex differences on children's self-reported emotion and on the degree of convergence between self-reports and objective coding. On the basis of the emotion-recognition literature (e.g., Widen & Russell, 2003) , I anticipated that younger children would be less likely to endorse more selective categories such as "surprised" and "scared." In a study of 5-to 7-year-olds, Glasberg and Aboud (1982) found that younger children were less likely than older children to endorse sadness. Thus, I tentatively speculated that older children would report higher levels of sadness. I hypothesized that older children would display greater convergence between their self-reports and objective coding of their emotions, given their greater cognitive abilities and specific skills in emotion understanding (Denham et al., 1994) .
Several lines of research suggest that boys and girls may differ in descriptions of their emotional state. Girls outperform boys on facial emotion recognition, even at young ages (McClure, 2000) . There is also evidence that parents socialize emotions differently in boys and girls; parents use a greater variety of emotion words when talking with daughters than with sons (Fivush, 1993; Kuebli, Butler, & Fivush, 1995) , and mothers discuss anger more with their sons and sadness more with their daughters (Fivush, 1991) . Thus, I predicted that girls would report a wider variety of emotions than would boys, that girls would report higher levels of sadness, and that boys would report higher levels of anger. Exploratory analyses examined gender differences in convergence between subjective and expressive components of emotion.
Finally, I examined whether children's verbal intelligence influenced their emotion self-reports, anticipating that verbal fluency would be associated with the use of a broader range of emotion words, as well as with greater convergence between subjective and expressive components of emotion.
Method Participants
Child participants (N ϭ 206) were recruited from the greater Chicago, Illinois, area for a study of child temperament and were between the ages of 36 and 83 months. Their mean age was 56.4 months (SD ϭ 12.0), and 48.1% were girls. Mothers were between the ages of 23 and 49 years (M ϭ 36.9, SD ϭ 4.8), and fathers were between the ages of 23 and 57 years (M ϭ 38.8, SD ϭ 5.8). Data on race and ethnicity and on family income were provided by 72.1% of mothers and by 70.2% of fathers. Of those, the ethnic composition was as follows: Caucasian/White (77.4%), Hispanic/ Latino (10.1%), African American/Black (8.0%), Asian (5.9%), other (3.1%), and bi-or multiracial (2.8%). (Categories do not sum to 100% because participants could endorse multiple categories.) Yearly family income ranged from $21,000 to greater than $100,000; 18.4% reported income less than $41,000. Children were administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1997) to assess their level of receptive language skills (M ϭ 106.62, SD ϭ 15.07).
Emotion Report Training
To circumvent verbal ability limitations in our younger participants, we used a protocol allowing children to indicate their emotional state by referring to pictorial representations of each emotion of interest. Given variability in children's recognition of facial expressions of emotion (Widen & Russell, 2003) , we conducted training to ensure that the children could accurately identify each emotion. Participants viewed six photographs of a child (approximately 10 years old and matched to participant sex) displaying a facial expression of a discrete emotion. Photographs were provided by Linda Camras and were used in previous studies of children's identification of facial expressions (Camras et al., 1990) . The pictures were validated using Ekman and Friesen's (1978) facial action coding system (FACS) and were determined to represent prototypical expressions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and surprise. A neutral (no emotion present) expression was included to provide a response option allowing children to indicate that they did not feel any emotion. The experimenter described the child in the neutral card as "not having any good or bad feelings; s/he doesn't feel anything."
The experimenter showed the child each picture and instructed him or her to freely label the expression. If the child provided the correct label, the experimenter acknowledged that they were correct and continued with the next photograph. If the child incorrectly labeled the emotion, the experimenter took three steps. First, the correct label was provided. Features of the face that defined the correct expression were cued (e.g., "see how his mouth is turned down like this? He is feeling sad"), followed by a brief story describing a situation that would typically elicit the emotion (e.g., for sadness, the experimenter said, "This boy feels sad. Maybe he was playing with his favorite toy and it broke"). The child was then asked to identify the emotion depicted again. If the child did not provide the correct label, the experimenter restated the correct emotion and gave a second (different) example of a typical elicitor of that emotion. The child was given a third opportunity to label the emotion. If the child provided an incorrect label, the experimenter moved on to the next photograph. This training was repeated for all six photographs and ended with the experimenter randomly placing all 6 photographs in front of the child and asking him or her to freely label each. Children's performance on each labeling round was recorded.
Children were then shown three drawings of a thermometer that varied by mercury level (one slightly full, one half full, and one completely full) and were told the corresponding label for each ("a little bit," "medium," and "a lot"). Children were asked to repeat the correct labels. In this sample, all children provided the correct labels on the first trial. The drawings were used to index the intensity with which the child experienced each emotion. The experimenter placed the three thermometer cards in front of the child next to the photograph depicting happiness and explained that the slightly full thermometer indicated that the child felt "a little bit happy," the half full thermometer "medium happy," and the full thermometer "very happy, a lot happy." Children were given examples of situations that might elicit each level of intensity. Immediately after the training period, the child participated in 10 tasks designed to elicit different emotions.
Laboratory Assessment of Child Emotion
Children completed 10 tasks designed to measure individual differences in temperament and emotion. Six were from the Preschool version of the Laboratory Temperament Assessment Battery (Lab-TAB; Goldsmith, Reilly, Lemery, Longley, & Prescott, 1995) , and four were newly developed or modified from the Lab-TAB for use in this study. All tasks were conducted by a female experimenter. Episodes are described in the order in which they were conducted, along with the emotions each was primarily designed to elicit. It is important to note that these tasks often elicit multiple emotions in young children (Durbin, in press ). Children took a break of 2-4 min between tasks in a separate room; this allowed the child to return to a baseline emotional state. The parent who accompanied the child was present for all but three episodes (noted below).
Exploring new objects (fear). The child was left to explore the room, which contained novel and ambiguous stimuli, including a tunnel connected to a tent, an animal crate containing toy mice, a remote-controlled spider, a plastic skull concealed under a red cloth, and a wooden box with sticky "worms" inside. The experimenter returned after 4.5 min and asked the child to touch each object.
Making a t-shirt (happiness). The child decorated a t-shirt with puff paints and fabric markers. The child was allowed to take the shirt home as a gift.
Disappointing toy (sadness, anger). The child was shown two pictures of appealing toys (puppets and remote-controlled cars) and one of an unappealing toy (plastic watering can) and asked to select his or her favorite. The experimenter returned with the unappealing toy instead of the child's choice and left the child to play with it for 2 min. The experimenter then returned with the preferred toy and the child and experimenter played with it together.
Stranger approach (fear). The child was left alone briefly in the testing room. A male research assistant entered and spoke to the child in a neutral voice while gradually walking closer and engaging in scripted conversation. The parent was not present in the room for this task. This task was not conducted for nine children because of lack of availability of a male research assistant.
Dress-up (happiness). The child and experimenter played with dress-up costumes (e.g., fireman's jacket and hat; feather boa and necklaces; and doctor's jacket and pretend stethoscope). The experimenter took a Polaroid picture of the child in his or her costume, and they watched the picture develop together.
Transparent box (sadness, anger).
The experimenter locked an appealing toy inside a clear plastic box and left the child with a set of incorrect keys to open the lock. After 3 min the experimenter returned and explained that she accidentally gave the child the wrong keys. The child was then given the correct key and encouraged to open the box and play with the toy.
Popping bubbles (happiness). The experimenter and child played with a bubble-shooting toy.
Impossibly perfect green circles (sadness, anger). The experimenter repeatedly asked the child to draw circles on a piece of paper, mildly criticizing each circle. After 2 min, the experimenter commented positively on the child's circles.
Pop-up snakes (happiness, surprise). The experimenter showed the child what appeared to be a can of potato chips but actually contained coiled spring snakes. The experimenter demonstrated the trick and then encouraged the child to surprise his or her parent with the snakes. The parent was not present in the room for the first half of this episode.
Box empty (sadness, anger). The experimenter gave the child a gift-wrapped empty box to open, under the pretense than an appealing gift was inside. The child was left alone for 2.5 min to discover that the box was empty, after which the experimenter returned with two small toys for the child to take home, explaining that she forgot to place the toys inside the box. The parent was not present for this episode.
Child Self-Report of Emotion
After each task, the child reported on his or her emotional state during the preceding task using the picture stimuli described above. The experimenter asked the child scripted questions regarding the emotion-eliciting aspects of the task (see the Appendix); questions were delivered with neutral vocal tone and facial affect to reduce the likelihood that experimenter behavior would bias children's responses. For each, the experimenter shuffled the photographs to randomize their presentation and placed them in front of the child. The experimenter asked the child to point to the card (or cards) that showed how they felt during a salient period of the task (e.g., after box empty, children were asked, "How did you feel when you opened the present and the box was empty?" and "How did you feel when I gave you the toys to take home?"). Children were allowed to indicate up to three different photographs, and the experimenter recorded each emotion endorsed. If the child noted only one emotion, the experimenter asked, "Did you feel anything else, or is that the only way you felt?" If the child pointed to more than three photographs, only the first three indicated were recorded. Children often responded with emotion words in addition to or in lieu of indicating a picture. The experimenter then asked the child to indicate the photograph corresponding to the label. If the child pointed to a photograph inconsistent with the label, the experimenter corrected him or her by giving the appropriate label for that picture and pointing to the photograph that corresponded with the label given by the child. Then the experimenter asked the child to indicate which of the two emotions depicted she or he felt.
After the child indicated which emotion (or emotions) she or he experienced, the experimenter removed the cards from the table. The experimenter placed the card representing the first emotion endorsed in front of the child and the three thermometer cards above that. The experimenter stated, "You said you felt [emotion] .
Point to the picture that shows how much you felt [emotion]: Was it a little bit, medium, or a lot?" This process was repeated for each emotion endorsed in the order in which they were indicated. Intensity was scored as follows: 0 ϭ emotion not endorsed; 1 ϭ endorsed "a little bit"; 2 ϭ endorsed "medium"; 3 ϭ endorsed "a lot."
Objective Coding of Children's Emotional Expressions
Each episode was coded using a global system previously used in studies of child temperament (Durbin, Hayden, Klein & Olino, 2007; Durbin, Klein, Hayden Buckley, & Moerk, 2005) . Coding was completed by the author and by trained graduate and undergraduate students. Coders were unaware of child self-report data. Discrete emotions (happiness, fear, sadness, anger, and surprise) were assessed by separately counting instances of facial, vocal, and bodily indicators of the emotion in each episode. Coding of facial expressions drew upon the AFFEX system (Izard, Dougherty, & Hembree, 1983) . Three levels of intensity were used: (1) ambiguous or low intensity (expression of low intensity in one facial region (eyes or mouth); (2) moderate intensity (expression is definitely present in at least one facial region); and (3) high intensity (expression is definitely present in both facial regions). Intensity of vocal and bodily indicators was indicated on a 3-point scale; for vocalizations, intensity was determined by extent to which the tone, content, or both conveyed the emotion, and for bodily expressions, by the intensity or magnitude of the behavior. Coders recorded each expression and its intensity that occurred across the entire episode. To index overall level of each emotion in an episode, a count of the total number of expressions of that emotion recorded (at any intensity and across all channels) was computed. Reliability of coding was indexed on a subsample of participants (N ϭ 15). Intraclass correlation coefficients for total expression counts were as follows: PE (.90), fear (.66), sadness (.79), anger (.81), and surprise (.65).
Results
Several analyses were conducted to examine the validity of children's self-reports of their emotional state. They addressed the following issues: (1) the number of children who failed the training task (were unable to correctly identify facial expressions of emotion and, therefore, would be expected to have difficulty using pictures of those emotions to report on their emotional state); (2) whether children failed to endorse some emotions, indicating that either the lab tasks never elicited these states or children lacked an understanding of or ability to report on those emotions; (3) whether children responded randomly to questions about their emotional state (endorsing all emotions at equivalent rates) or provided emotion reports that differed systematically across tasks intended to elicit different emotional states; and (4) the magnitude of convergence between self-report and objective coding of emotion.
Training Task Failures
Most children performed well during the training task; 80.1% accurately identified all 6 emotions by the final trial. Of the remainder, most mislabeled only one to two stimuli (10.7%), and a few mislabeled three (3.2%), four (2.2%), five (3.2), or all six stimuli (0.5%). Performance on the training task was examined as a predictor of convergence between self-report and objective coding of emotion (see below).
Frequency and Intensity of Endorsement of Each Emotion Across Tasks
To provide overall indices of the degree to which children reported each emotion, I averaged intensity ratings for each emotion across episodes, and I computed a sum of the number of times the child endorsed the emotion (at any intensity) across all 18 questions from the 10 episodes. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for self-reported intensity and frequency of the six emotions (including neutral). For comparison, descriptive data for objective coding (mean total counts for each emotion across episodes, and the proportion of children who expressed an emotion at least once) are also shown. The most frequently self-reported emotion was happiness, followed by surprise, sadness, neutrality, anger, and Note. Table shows total number of times children reported each emotion and average intensity of each emotion across all episodes. M ϭ mean; SD ϭ standard deviation; N ϭ 206. Number of times reported ϭ the number of times the child endorsed the state out of the 18 questions; % reported ϭ percentage of participants who reported the emotion at least once; number of different emotions ϭ the average number of different states (neutral, surprise, happiness, fear, sadness, and anger) endorsed at least once by each child across all 10 episodes; (possible range ϭ 0, for no emotion ever endorsed, to 6 (all 6 different emotions endorsed at least once). For objective coding, total counts ϭ the total number of expressions of that emotion coded.
fear. Thus, affectively positive states were more commonly reported than were negative emotions. This may be due to a tendency toward socially desirable responding, or because each task-even those designed to elicit a negative emotion-also included a substantial positive component. Consistent with the latter, the most commonly coded expression was also happiness; indeed, happiness expressions were nearly 8.8 times as frequent as the most commonly coded negative emotion (sadness). On average, children endorsed approximately four different emotions across all episodes (range ϭ 1-6), suggesting that most children acknowledged experiencing a variety of emotions during the course of the lab battery.
In general, the pattern of endorsement across emotions was similar to the relative mean levels of coding of each emotion, with the exception of fear. The low frequency of self-reported fear is consistent with the fact that only two tasks were designed to elicit fear (vs. four for sadness and anger), or it may be due to the difficulty that young children have in understanding and applying language for fear, in comparison with other emotions (Widen & Russell, 2003) . Self-reports of most emotions were normally distributed, with the clear exception of fear, and to a lesser extent, anger and neutrality. For objective coding, counts for emotions were also normally distributed, with the exception of fear and surprise. The nonnormal distributions took the form of zero-inflated negative distributions (with many participants having none or a small number of that emotion). To account for nonnormality in self-report data for fear and anger, analyses were also conducted using variables subjected to a square root transformation (described below).
Thus, self-report and coding methods generally converged in the relative frequency of each emotion across the lab battery, but there was a tendency for children to endorse emotions at a lower rate than they were coded, an effect that was more striking for negative than for positive emotions. This may reflect a threshold effect for reporting emotions. The objective coding system included multiple channels (vocal, bodily, and facial) at intensity levels that ranged from high to low (the latter of which could be subtle). Coded happiness expressions, in addition to being much more common than negative emotions overall, were also more likely to be coded as moderate or high intensity than were negative emotions. The mean proportion of total expressions coded that were of low intensity was .42 for happiness, in comparison with .74 for anger, .70 for sadness, and .64 for fear. Thus, most coded negative expressions were of relatively low intensity, perhaps below a threshold for reporting. Alternatively, given evidence for direct feedback from facial expressions of emotion to subjective experience (e.g., Soussignan, 2002) , perhaps subjective reports of emotion may be more tied to facial expressions than are other indicators of emotion. Consistent with this, a greater proportion of coded happiness expressions were facial expressions (0.77), in comparison with .43 for sadness, .37 for anger, and .11 for fear. Thus, children may endorse negative emotions less frequently because of differential subjective feedback from facial versus vocal or bodily expressions, or perhaps the latter channels are less reliable indicators of underlying subjective emotional state.
Frequency of Reports of Multiple Emotions
Of all emotions endorsed by children, 22.7% were endorsed along with 1-2 other emotions. Accounting for differential overall endorsement, those most commonly reported in a "blend" were surprise (41.2% of surprise reports co-occurred with another emotion), fear (33.3%), and neutrality (33.1%), in comparison with low levels for happiness (14.1%).
Frequency and Intensity of Emotions by Episode Type
I next examined the validity of children's subjective emotion reports by testing whether they were responsive to the context in which they were reported. I predicted that (1) within any episode, children should endorse emotions at different rates (i.e., not equivalently) and their relative endorsement should be consistent with the intent of the task and the relative amount of each emotion observed in objective coding in that task; and (2) reports of a particular emotion should be higher in those tasks designed to elicit that emotion than in tasks intended to elicit other emotions. I did not assume, however, that each task would elicit only a single emotion, because developmental studies demonstrate that lab tasks commonly evoke multiple emotions, sometimes even incongruous emotions (e.g., Durbin, in press; Durbin et al., 2005; Kochanska, 2001) .
For comparisons across the lab battery, I categorized episodes on the basis of two criteria: (1) the primary emotion they were designed to elicit, and (2) when available, empirical data on the validity of these or similar tasks for tapping particular emotions (e.g., Kochanska, 2001; Pfeifer, Goldsmith, Davidson, & Rickman, 2002) . Episodes were grouped as follows: fear (exploring new objects and stranger approach), sadness/anger (disappointing toy, transparent box, green circles, and box empty), and happiness (making a t-shirt, dress-up, popping bubbles, and pop-up snakes). Sadness and anger were grouped together on the basis of evidence that they commonly cooccur in children (Izard et al., 1995) and on the basis of theoretical arguments that both represent responses to goal blockage (Lewis & Ramsay, 2005) . Importantly, although I separated episodes designed to exclusively elicit happiness, even the negative emotion-eliciting tasks would also be expected to produce happiness to some degree, because each involved a lengthy positive element (such as playing with a toy), both for ethical reasons and to maintain children's engagement in the lab tasks.
For tasks with multiple emotion-eliciting events, children were asked separate questions about each. For some episodes, this involved both a negative event and a positive event. For example, for transparent box, children were asked, "How did you feel when you were trying to get the toy out of the box and none of the keys worked?" and "How did you feel when I helped you unlock the box and you got to play with the toy?" Some involved two positive aspects; for example, for popping bubbles, children were asked, "How did you feel when I blew bubbles and you popped them?" and "How did you feel when you got to blow the bubbles and I popped them?" Questions were designated as positive or negative if they unambiguously asked about events that should elicit an emotion of that valence. Those undesignated were ambiguous; for example, for exploring new objects, children were asked, "How did you feel when you got to look at all those new things by yourself?" It was equally plausible that exploring ambiguous objects could be positive (of interest) or negative (anxiety provoking). Table 2 shows children's responses to all questions for each episode (labeled Q1 and Q2). For a majority of participants (80.5%), I was also able to compute corresponding objective coding counts for the portions of the episodes referred to by each question, but only for those episodes in which the two questions referred to clearly temporally distinct events. Thus, Table 2 also shows descriptive data for those episode segments, whereas descriptive data on total counts across the entire episode are shown for the remaining tasks. The remaining participants were coded using an earlier version of the protocol that did not require coders to note the time at which each coded expression occurred, precluding an examination of coding counts within portions of each episode. However, these participants did not differ from those for which such data were available on mean levels of objective coding of any emotion. As was predicted, children's self-reported emotional state did differ within and across tasks designed to elicit different emotions. Table 2 shows the percentage of children who reported each emotion in response to each question, the self-reported intensity of each emotion, as well as the corresponding descriptive data for objective coding indices. To test the hypothesis that children's self-reports of emotion would vary consistently with the intended emotional targets of each task, I performed two sets of analyses. First, McNemar tests of paired proportions tested differences between rates of endorsement of each emotion within each task; emotions that differed significantly in their likelihood of endorsement in response to each question are indicated with different superscripts in Table 2 . Similarly, I compared the frequency of coding of different emotions within episodes (or segments of episodes) using paired t tests (significant differences are indicated by different superscripts). Second, repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on mean self-reported intensity of each emotion and objective coding as a function of each episode category (fear, sadness/anger, and happiness).
Happiness. In terms of relative endorsement of different emotions within episodes, happiness was the most commonly endorsed emotion for all but two questions. This is consistent with the findings for objective coding of emotions, for which happiness was also the most common emotion in each episode. Thus, self-report and objective coding emotion indices produced similar findings regarding the relative predominance of happiness in comparison with other emotions.
Importantly, although happiness was common in most episodes, self-reported happiness intensity did differ significantly across episode type, F(2, 408) ϭ 70.27, p Ͻ .0001, partial 2 ϭ .26; M ϭ 2.04 (SD ϭ 0.82) in happiness episodes, in comparison with 1.50 (0.82) in sadness/anger episodes and 1.49 (0.73) in fear episodes. The difference between sadness/anger and happiness episodes was significant, F(1, 204) ϭ 164.51, p Ͻ .0001, as was that between happiness and fear episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 78.71, p Ͻ .0001. Fear and sadness/anger episodes did not differ from one another, F(1, 204) Ͻ 1. As was predicted, children's happiness reports varied across tasks differing in their intent to evoke positive versus negative emotions. For objective coding of happiness across the episode categories, differences among all three episode types were significant (happiness was highest in happiness episodes, followed by sadness/anger, then fear episodes).
Sadness. Sadness was the most common self-reported negative emotion; it was most frequent in response to box empty, disappointing toy, and transparent box (all designed to elicit sadness and anger). Within-episode differences (evaluated by McNemar's test) were also evident; after happiness, sadness was the second most commonly endorsed emotion in response to negative questions for sadness/ anger episodes, and it was the most frequently endorsed emotion in response to the negative question for box empty. Sadness reports were very rare in response to happiness episodes, and among fear tasks, were relatively frequent only for the second question in stranger approach. These findings are consistent with paired t tests comparing objective coding of emotions within fear episodes, because sadness was the second most commonly coded negative emotion (after fear) in response to fear tasks.
Self-reported sadness intensity ratings did differ significantly across episode categories, F(2, 408) ϭ 46.32, p Ͻ .0001, partial Anger. Findings for self-reported anger were similar to those for sadness. Anger was infrequently reported in happiness and fear episodes, with the exception of stranger approach and pop-up snakes. Child participants may have perceived the stranger as a threat and reacted with hostility to his presence; nonhuman primate infants have been observed to engage in hostile behaviors in response to similar laboratory stranger situations (e.g., Kalin, Shelton, & Takahashi, 1991) . Indeed, between 7% and 8% of children were coded as exhibiting anger in stranger approach. McNemar's tests revealed that for negative questions from sadness/anger tasks, self-reports of both anger and sadness were more common than were reports of fear, suggesting that these tasks elicited higher levels of the target emotions than another negative state (fear). Comparing sadness and anger self-reports in these tasks, I found that anger was less frequently reported than sadness for two questions, and they did not differ significantly for the other two. These findings were consistent with paired t test comparisons within episodes for coding of anger and sadness (see Table 2 for all comparisons). As was predicted, self-reported anger intensity ratings differed significantly across episode categories, F(2, 408) ϭ 29.08, p Ͻ .0001, partial 2 ϭ .12; M ϭ 0.29 (SD ϭ 0.42) for sadness/anger episodes, versus 0.14 (0.32) for fear episodes, and 0.07 (0.21) for happiness episodes. Post hoc contrasts showed that the difference between sadness/anger and fear episodes was significant, F(1, 204) ϭ 19.41, p Ͻ .0001, as was that between sadness/anger and happiness episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 60.32, p Ͻ .0001. Anger intensity also differed across fear and happiness episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 7.39, p ϭ .007. Children's reports of anger in sadness/anger episodes were normally distributed, but deviated from normality for fear episodes (skew ϭ 3.41, kurtosis ϭ 12.25) and for happiness episodes (skew ϭ 2.38, kurtosis ϭ 5.34). However, differences among all three episode types on square-roottransformed anger intensity variables were still significant. Thus, children's self-reported anger intensity differed in a consistent pattern across tasks designed to elicit distinct emotions. The pattern of findings was somewhat different for objective coding of anger; the highest levels were observed in sadness/anger episodes, which differed from both fear and happiness episodes ( p Ͻ .0001). However, by contrast to self-report, fear and happiness episodes did not differ in mean levels of coded anger, which were low in both episode categories.
Surprise. For surprise, examination of endorsement rates revealed a distinction between the self-report and coding data. Surprise was typically the second most commonly endorsed state, whereas few expressions of surprise were coded across the battery. Consistent with the notion that violations of expectations are involved in surprise (Scherer, Zentner, & Stern, 2004) , children were most likely to report surprise after aspects of tasks that violated expectations (receiving an empty present after being told a gift was inside, or the unheralded appearance of the stranger). As was noted above, however, surprise was reported as the sole emotional response to a task only about 58% of the time it was endorsed; for the remainder, children reported surprise along with another emotion.
Self-report ratings of surprise intensity also differed across episode categories, F(2, 408) ϭ 6.16, p ϭ .002, partial 2 ϭ .03. Mean surprise intensity was comparable across fear (M ϭ 0.60 (SD ϭ 0.71) and happiness episodes, M ϭ 0.56 (SD ϭ 0.61), F(1, 204) Ͻ 1. However, surprise intensity was higher in happiness episodes than in sadness/anger episodes, M ϭ 0.44 (SD ϭ 0.58), F(1, 204) ϭ 13.79, p ϭ .0001, and was higher in fear episodes than in sadness/anger episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 8.71, p ϭ .004. Surprise intensity ratings for each episode category were normally distributed. As for self-report, objective coding of surprise was lower in sadness/anger episodes than in fear or happiness episodes ( p Ͻ .001 for both); however, the difference between the latter two categories was also significant, with higher surprise coded in response to happiness tasks ( p Ͻ .0001). This is consistent with the tendency for surprise to be "blended" with happiness reports, suggesting that children's endorsement of surprise may reflect a positive emotional state.
Fear. Reports of fear were most common to exploring new objects, pop-up snakes, and stranger approach, and it was rarely reported for the remaining episodes. McNemar's tests comparing the endorsement of different emotions revealed that within fear tasks, children were significantly more likely to report fear than other negative emotions (sadness or anger) in response to only one of the four questions; they were equally likely to report sadness or fear for the other three questions. The coding data revealed a more differentiated pattern of responses, such that coded fear expressions were significantly more frequent than were both anger and sadness in fear tasks. There was more specificity of children's self-reports within sadness/anger tasks; in response to negative questions for these episodes, children were significantly more likely to endorse sadness or anger than to endorse fear. Thus, children endorsed fear at a low rate overall (even to fear tasks), but when they did endorse fear, it was largely in response to episodes designed to elicit fear. Perhaps children were unaware of or reluctant to report on fear in comparison with other negative emotions; this is consistent with evidence that fear may be a later acquired concept than are sadness and anger (Widen & Russell, 2003) . As was noted above, coded fear expressions were overwhelmingly bodily or vocal indicators; only 11% were facial expressions. Thus, the low rates of endorsement may have emerged from the low level of facial expressions or the generally low intensity of fear that was observed in the lab tasks (64% were low intensity).
As was predicted, children's self-reported intensity of fear did differ significantly across episode category, F(2, 408) ϭ 30.25, p Ͻ .0001, partial 2 ϭ .13; M ϭ 0.24 (SD ϭ 0.43) in fear episodes, 0.07 (0.23) in sadness/anger episodes, and 0.08 (0.29) in happiness episodes. Post hoc contrasts revealed that fear intensity differed significantly between the fear and sadness/anger episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 38.28, p Ͻ .0001, and between the fear and happiness episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 31.86, p Ͻ .0001, but not between the sadness/anger and happiness episodes, F(1, 204) Ͻ 1. Fear intensity reports for each episode category were nonnormally distrib-uted (skewness values from 2.58 to 6.65; kurtosis values from 9.21 to 57.94), with intensity of fear in fear episode the closest to approximately normality. Results comparing the three episodes using square-root-transformed fear intensity ratings were the same as those for untransformed variables. Analyses of objective coding of fear revealed the same pattern of findings, with fear more commonly coded in fear episodes than in either sadness/anger or happiness episodes, but no significant difference between fear coded in sadness/anger versus happiness episodes (although this comparison approached significance, p ϭ .087).
Neutral. I had no predictions regarding neutral ratings, because this state was included so that children would not be constrained by the options to indicate that they experienced an emotion when they did not. As such, interpretation of neutral affect intensity is difficult. McNemar's tests within episodes revealed that endorsement rates of neutrality generally fell in between those for happiness and surprise versus negative emotional states. Neutral intensity ratings did differ across episode categories, F(2, 408) ϭ 22.64, p Ͻ .0001, partial 2 ϭ .10; they were highest for fear episodes (M ϭ 0.40, SD ϭ 0.54), followed by sadness/ anger (M ϭ 0.24, SD ϭ 0.41), and happiness episodes (M ϭ 0.21, SD ϭ 0.41). The difference between happiness and sadness/anger episodes was not significant, F(1, 204) ϭ 1.83, p ϭ .178. However, neutral reports were more intense following fear episodes than following happiness episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 35.60, p Ͻ .0001, and in fear episodes than in sadness/anger episodes, F(1, 204) ϭ 22.53, p ϭ .0001. Neutral intensity ratings for fear episodes were normally distributed, and those for the other two episode categories deviated from normality (skew ϭ 2.86, kurtosis ϭ 9.46, for happiness episodes; skew ϭ 2.57, kurtosis ϭ 8.96, for sadness/anger episodes). However, findings for square-root-transformed variables were the same as those for the original variables.
Finally, as another means of addressing the coherence of children's self-reports of emotion, for those tasks that involved multiple questions, I compared self-reported intensity ratings of each emotion across the two questions by using paired t tests. Five tasks included a negative question and a positive question; for four of these (all but stranger approach), children reported higher levels of negative emotions to the negative question than to the positive question, and higher levels of happiness to the positive question than to the negative question.
In summary, analyses indicated that children reported on their emotions in coherent and theoretically consistent ways. Children's subjective reports varied predictably across different kinds of episodes, such that (1) reports of each emotion were more intense to tasks intended to elicit that emotion than to tasks designed to produce other emotions, and (2) within task, these reports varied according to the element of the task (negative or positive) that was queried about. Fear was a notable exception; it was infrequently reported. Results were largely the same when analyses were conducted dropping children who performed poorly on the training task (results available upon request). Importantly, comparisons of the frequency of selfreports of different emotions within the same episode, and comparisons of the mean intensity of self-reports of the same emotion across different types of episodes, largely revealed very similar findings as corresponding analyses examining objective coding measures. This indicates that despite differences in the overall frequency of different emotions across self-report and objective coding, both methods reveal similar patterns of specificity and sensitivity of children's emotional reactions to tasks designed to elicit a range of positive and negative emotions. Finally, consistent with functionalist models of emotion (Campos et al., 1994) , structured lab tasks elicited a range of emotional reactions from children in this sample; no task uniformly elicited a single emotion.
Age and Sex Effects on Children's Self-Reported Emotional State
Inconsistent with my prediction, age was only weakly associated with child self-reported emotion indices. Older age was weakly associated with more intense reports of happiness (r ϭ .15, p ϭ .029) and moderately associated with intensity and frequency of surprise (r ϭ .25, p Ͻ .0001, and r ϭ .23, p ϭ .001, respectively). Age was weakly negatively correlated with intensity of fear (r ϭ Ϫ.16, p ϭ .024) and of anger (r ϭ Ϫ.15, p ϭ .037), as well as frequency of fear reports (r ϭ Ϫ.17, p ϭ .016). Older children did not report a broader range of emotions; the correlation between age and number of different emotions endorsed was Ϫ.01. Also counter to predictions based on the literature on differential socialization of emotion in boys and girls, the sexes did not differ on frequency or intensity of any emotion; effect sizes ( 2 ) ranged from 0 to 0.003. Thus, we found no evidence that boys and girls report different levels of any basic emotion in response to emotion-eliciting lab tasks, or the number of different emotions they reported.
Effects of Children's Verbal Intelligence on Their Self-Reported Emotional State
To examine whether children with more developed verbal abilities produced different reports of their emotions than did those with less developed skills, I examined the association between receptive vocabulary scores (on the PPVT) and emotion report indices. Verbal ability was related to performance in the training task; children with higher PPVT scores labeled more of the facial expressions accurately (r ϭ .22, p ϭ .002). The mean correlation between child self-report variables and PPVT scores was .03, ranging from Ϫ.10 (fear intensity) to .14 (happiness intensity). Thus, there was little evidence that children's verbal intelligence was associated with their reported intensity of any emotion.
Convergence Between Child Report and Observational Coding of Emotions
As an initial examination of convergence, I calculated correlations within episode (or within episode segment, for those tasks with two self-report questions) between self-reported intensity of each emotion and objective coding indices. Table 3 shows results of these analyses, specifically average correlation coefficients collapsed (a) across all questions and episodes, (b) across episode types (happiness, sadness/anger, and fear episodes), (c) across negatively valenced questions, and (d) across positively valenced questions. Convergence for each emotion was modest within episodes, and somewhat higher for anger and sadness than for the other emotions. Convergent associations tended to be slightly higher within tasks designed to elicit a particular emotion, and most correlations across emotion and method (i.e., self-reported happiness with objective coding of fear, sadness, etc.) were also modest. These results suggest that for any single episode, betweensubjects correlations between children's self-reported and objectively coded emotion are rather weak (although convergent associations were highly variable, ranging from Ϫ.12 to .42 within episodes). This implies that children's self-reports of emotional intensity are poor predictors of their overall degree of expression (i.e., absolute level) of an emotion for any single laboratory task.
However, between-subjects correlations do not adequately address the within-subject nature of the data structure; children reported on multiple emotions across 10 tasks, and each task was coded for each emotion. Thus, although children's emotion reports may be weakly associated with individual differences in absolute level of an emotion within a single lab task, children's selfreported emotional intensity and objective coding of an emotion may correlate within children across tasks, such that the relative amount of an emotion the child reports across tasks varies significantly with differences in objective coding of the degree of that emotion the child expresses across the same tasks. Multilevel modeling (MLM) is a more statistically powerful approach to addressing this question, using nested within-subject data to quantify the extent to which dynamic variation across tasks in children's self-reported emotions covaries with objective coding. I used this approach to examine convergent validity between children's subjective reports and objective coding of each emotion, wherein emotion variables (child report and objective coding) were nested within participants across all 10 tasks, and analyses were conducted separately for each emotion (happiness, fear, sadness, anger, and surprise).
In each analysis, objective coding of the emotion was the dependent variable, modeled in the Level 1 MLM equation as a function of two parameters: an intercept, and a slope coefficient for predictors that vary across tasks (in this study, the child's selfreported intensity of the emotion for each task). The intercept is the predicted value of the dependent variable when other predictors are a zero value. The slope quantifies the degree of association between intensity of children's subjective reports of an emotion and objective coding of that same emotion, giving an index of the magnitude of convergent validity of child self-reports with objective coding. The Level 1 slope parameter was allowed to vary randomly across participants to determine whether there were significant individual differences across children in convergence. If significant, the slope coefficient for child self-report was then modeled as a dependent variable in the Level 2 MLM equation to explore whether other factors are significantly associated with individual differences across children in their degree of convergence. At Level 2, the slope for each child is predicted as a function of task-invariant factors (age, sex, verbal intelligence, and success in the training task). First, each Level 2 variable was entered separately in different models to maximize power to identify all possible predictors. Second, all significant zero-order predictors were then entered simultaneously in a single model to determine which held when accounting for the other predictors (see Table 5 ).
For each emotion, an unconditional-means model (including only the intercept term) was conducted first to provide a baseline against which to evaluate whether models incorporating child self-reports of the same emotion as a Level 1 predictor (convergence models) resulted in improved model fit. Comparing these two models yields a pseudo R 2 statistic that quantifies the magnitude of association between self-reported and objective coding of the emotion. Fixed effects and variance components for the unconditional means and convergence models for each emotion are shown in Table 4 , followed by models incorporating Level 2 predictors of convergence. Exploratory analyses examined whether self-reports of other emotions also predicted coding for each emotion beyond the effects of self-reports of the converging emotion. MLM was conducted with HLM 6.06, using full maximum likelihood estimation.
Happiness. Including child self-reports of happiness intensity as a predictor of coded PE resulted in a better-fitting model than an unconditional means model, 2 ⌬ (3) ϭ 46.45, p ϭ Ͻ.00001; pseudo R 2 ϭ .04. Fixed effects revealed that child happiness reports were significantly and positively related to total PE counts across episodes. Convergence between child reports and coding varied only marginally across children ( p Ͻ .10); therefore, no Level 2 predictors were explored. To explore whether coded happiness was related to any other self-reported emotion, I conducted analyses in which self-reports of each of the other emotions were modeled as Level 1 predictors. Three were significant univariate predictors; surprise was positively associated with coded PE, and self-reported neutrality and sadness were negatively associated. To evaluate their incremental predictive validity beyond self-reports of happiness, I compared models including only selfreported happiness to those that also incorporated these additional emotions into the model, and computed pseudo R 2 estimates to index the additional predictive validity contributed by self-reports of the other emotions. The two affectively neutral emotions (surprise and neutrality) were entered first, because they were most similar to happiness in valence. In comparison with the model including only child self-reported happiness as a predictor, the model including neutral and surprise reports accounted for an additional 1.2% of the variance in coded PE. Sadness was added to their degree of convergence between self-reports and objective coding, but these differences were not associated with age, sex, PPVT scores, or performance in the training task (all were nonsignificant Level 2 predictors). The only other child self-report variable associated with coded fear was sadness, but it explained only a modest additional amount of variance in coded fear, in comparison with the model including only child self-reported fear (pseudo R 2 Ͻ .01). Sadness. Child self-reported sadness intensity contributed to model fit above an unconditional means model predicting total coded sadness expressions, 2 ⌬ (3) ϭ 197.85, p Ͻ .00001; pseudo R 2 ϭ .12. There were significant individual differences in convergence between self-report and objective coding, but these were not explained by age or sex. However, there was an effect of higher verbal ability, which predicted greater convergence between selfreports and objective coding of sadness, t(201) ϭ 2.85, p ϭ .005. Similarly, children who mislabeled more emotions in the training task demonstrated lower convergence, t(179) ϭ Ϫ2.70, p ϭ .008. When both were entered as simultaneous Level 2 predictors of convergence (shown in Table 4 ), verbal ability remained significant, whereas training task performance was marginally significant ( p ϭ .066). Child self-reported anger was positively associated with coded sadness, whereas self-reported happiness was negatively associated. Adding the self-reported emotion of the same valence (anger) to the model including self-reported sadness resulted in a small increment in variance explained (pseudo R 2 ϭ .02). The subsequent addition of self-reported happiness to this model resulted in a modest contribution to the prediction of coded sadness beyond the effects of self-reported sadness and anger (pseudo R 2 ϭ .01). Anger. Child self-reported anger intensity improved model fit above an unconditional means model, 2 ⌬ (3) ϭ 98.97, p Ͻ .0001, pseudo R 2 ϭ .08. Children differed significantly in their level of convergence. Older age was associated with greater convergence, t(200) ϭ 3.67, p ϭ .001, as was the number of emotions mislabeled in the training task, t(179) ϭ Ϫ2.48, p ϭ .014, and higher verbal ability, t(198) ϭ 2.29, p ϭ .023. When all three predictors were entered simultaneously (see Table 4 ), only child age remained a significant predictor of convergence. Self-reports of several other emotions were significantly associated with coded anger; sadness was positively associated, and happiness, surprise, and fear were negatively associated. The negatively valenced emotions (sadness and fear) explained an additional 2.6% of the variance in coded anger beyond the effects of self-reported anger. The positive/neutral states (happiness and surprise) made a modest incremental contribution to coded anger beyond the three negative emotions (pseudo R 2 ϭ .01). Surprise. Inclusion of child self-reported surprise intensity as a Level 1 predictor of objective coding of total surprise expressions resulted in improved model fit over the unconditional means model, 2 ⌬ (3) ϭ 9.12, p Ͻ .028; the effect size was quite modest (pseudo R 2 ϭ .01). Children varied only marginally in their degree of convergence ( p Ͻ .10); therefore, no Level 2 predictors were explored. Self-reported neutral ratings were negatively associated with coded surprise, but contributed very little variance beyond the effects of self-reported surprise (pseudo R 2 Ͻ.01).
Discussion
This study provided evidence that children ages 3 to 6 years can provide valid reports of their emotional state in response to structured lab tasks designed to elicit positive and negative emotions. Children acknowledged experiencing a range of emotions, and their reports of each emotion differed systematically both within and across tasks intended to elicit distinct emotions. In addition to supporting the validity of children's self-reported emotions, these findings provide an additional source of convergent validity for laboratory emotion-eliciting tasks. These tasks evoked patterns of subjective emotional responses that largely mirrored the pattern for observed emotion, although children generally endorsed emotions at a rate that was lower than they were coded. In particular, fear was infrequently reported, although self-reports of this state did vary across tasks designed to elicit fear versus other emotions. Negative emotions may have been reported less frequently because of threshold effects resulting from the fact that the negative emotions observed in the lab were typically of lower intensity than were happiness expressions, as well as less likely to be facial expressions (in comparison with vocal or bodily expressions).
There was little evidence for age or sex effects on the overall frequency or intensity of children's reports of any emotion assessed in this study. These findings suggest only minor changes in children's self-reported emotional state across the 3-to 6-year-old age range, and demonstrate that boys and girls are similar in their level of subjective positive and negative emotions in response to structured laboratory tasks. These findings were inconsistent with speculation based on the literature on socialization of emotion that girls and boys would differ on their acknowledgment of feelings of sadness or anger. Moreover, sex did not moderate convergence between expressive and subjective components of any emotion.
Importantly, in addition to relating meaningfully to the intended emotional target of each episode, children's self-reports of intensity of each emotion (happiness, fear, sadness, anger, and surprise) were significantly associated with objective coding of individual differences in the degree to which children expressed that emotion across the lab tasks. This provides evidence for the convergent validity of these self-reports with a gold-standard measure of emotion. However, it is important to note that the magnitude of convergence was small to moderate; MLM-derived estimates of the amount of variance in objective coding of emotion accounted for by child self-report ranged from 1% for surprise to 15% for fear. This suggests some independence of subjective and expressive measures of emotion in young children. Importantly, convergence within emotions (e.g., self-reported fear and coded fear) was typically higher than were associations across emotions (e.g., self-reported sadness and coded fear). For all three negative emotions, there were also individual differences in degree of convergence; older age predicted greater convergence for anger, and greater verbal ability and emotion recognition skill did so for both anger and sadness. Significant individual differences remained even after accounting for these factors, suggesting that future studies could explore other factors contributing to convergence between expressive and subjective emotion in children (e.g., temperament traits, measures of socialization of emotion, and psycho-pathology indices). Importantly, convergence of self-reported emotion with objective coding was more pronounced when examining within-subject changes in the relative amount of an emotion across the battery of lab tasks than for between-subjects correlations within a single task. This suggests that children's self-reports can provide important information about differences in subjective intensity of an emotion within a child across several stimuli or contexts, but that self-report is less useful for understanding a child's absolute level of an emotion in response to a single stimulus or context. This study had a number of strengths, including the use of a battery of 10 structured tasks designed to elicit a broad range of positive and negative emotions, and use of objective coding of emotional expressions across multiple channels (facial, vocal, and bodily). Child self-report was facilitated by the use of an interview procedure and training protocol that allowed children to report on a range of emotions in response to structured questions addressing the salient emotional events in each lab task. This study examined developmental differences in child emotion across a relatively broad age range from 3 to 6 years, a period of marked development in cognitive skills related to labeling of emotional states and in the regulation of emotional expressions.
There were also some important limitations to this study. We collected reports of emotion from children to a series of structured laboratory tasks. The generalizability of these findings to children's descriptions of their emotions in more naturalistic contexts or across broader time spans is unknown. In addition, evaluation of children's emotional state was limited by the interview protocol to basic emotion terms (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and surprise). Furthermore, we collected self-reports at the end of each task rather than during the task (when memory for the emotion would be strongest). Also, it is not clear how the interview protocol may have influenced children's experience and expression of emotion. It is possible that by asking children to report on their emotion after each task, they experienced or attended to their emotional reactions differently. Further studies comparing conditions in which children do versus do not report on their emotion would be necessary to test for such processes. Studies of older children, who have more advanced verbal skills in general or are specifically more facile with respect to emotion language, could allow child participants to freely describe their emotional reactions rather than selecting them from among a predetermined set of states. Finally, it should be noted that while coding of emotional expressions provides a reasonable target for examination of convergence for other emotion measures, expressions capture only some of the features that characterize emotion, and thus provide only a partial gold standard. Different emotions were coded more or less reliably in this study, with fear and surprise having the lowest interrater agreement. Thus, findings for these emotions should be interpreted with more caution.
In summary, this study provides evidence for young children's ability to report meaningfully on their emotional state and suggests that emotion-eliciting laboratory tasks do indeed evoke changes in subjective emotional state in young children. These findings suggest that subjective elements of emotion can be measured in the preschool-early childhood period, and that they validly capture responses to structured emotion probes. Future research should capitalize on self-report methods to explore longer-term developmental change in subjective emotions, the structure of subjective reports of positive and negative emotions in children, and their relationship to other components and correlates of emotion.
